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REPETITION EFFECTS IN OBJECT SWITCH COSTS: AGAINST A SWITCH COST 
MEASURE OF A DISCRETE FOCUS OF ATTENTION 
 
Christopher L. Blume 
Dr. Nelson Cowan, Thesis Supervisor 
ABSTRACT 
 
Object switch costs have been taken to index items in the focus of attention (e.g., 
Oberauer, 2005).  They refer to savings in reaction time (RT) when a target object to 
which a response must be made is the same as the target object in the previous trial, 
compared to trials in which there is a switch to a different target object.  It has been 
presumed that switch costs occur because each target object remains in the focus until 
there is a need to switch to a different target.  Here we show, however, that object switch 
costs can increase as the number of repetitions of a target object increase from 1 to 3 
before a possible switch. If switch costs solely reflect presence of an object in the focus 
of attention, then presence in that focus would appear to be gradated rather than all-or-
none.  Additional interpretation of the data comes from a separate examination of switch 
and no-switch trials across different numbers of repetitions. These data are inconsistent 
with a single-item focus of attention because of two specific patterns of data: a shorter 
RT for non-switching trials when going from 1 to 2 repetitions, and a longer RT for 
switching trials going from 2 to 3 repetitions.
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
 
This project re-examines evidence regarding the nature of the human focus of 
attention. In particular, does the focus of attention include a single item or several items? 
And if there are several items in focus at one time, are they of equal strength or 
magnitudes differing in a gradated manner? Below I outline an essential historical 
background of research on the focus of attention as well as how this construct has been 
measured. Different interpretations of these measures are then discussed from the 
theoretical standpoint of the capacity of the focus. These interpretations are most 
commonly divided into theories of a single-item capacity vs. the notion of a focus that 
can hold multiple items at any one time. 
Historical Background of the Focus of Attention 
Attention is a concept that has been closely linked to primary memory. James 
(1890) defined primary memory as the trailing edge of the conscious present.  This 
trailing edge referred to all information held in mind that could prove relevant to an 
upcoming task. However, labeling an item as primary within the memory system may be 
a relative term based upon cognitive task demands on resources. This could be the case if 
not all items in the conscious present are considered equally relevant. For this reason, 
attention has long been considered from viewpoints that place divisions and limits on 
what is attended and how much can be attended. For example, Broadbent’s (1958) filter 
model introduced the notion of levels of attentional processing as well as which items 
reach the higher levels. Similarly, Pashler (1992) has theorized about a cognitive 
bottleneck limiting the number of items that can be attended to at a high enough level to 
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complete a cognitive task. These and other ideas about the limits of attention have led to 
the modern notion of a focus of attention. Within memory research, the focus of attention 
generally refers to those items held in mind at the greatest degree of accessibility. In other 
words, items in the focus are available at the highest level of attentional processing and 
could be maintained beyond any cognitive bottleneck. Theories that attempt to unify 
attentional processing with a memory system (i.e., working memory, Miller, Galanter, & 
Pribram, 1960; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974), would eventually need to operationalize the 
concept of the focus of attention. 
Working memory refers to the small amount of information held in a highly 
accessible state in order to carry out cognitive tasks. Numerous processes have been 
theorized within the construct of working memory often describing varying levels of 
information accessibility. One of the more widely recognized of these processes is the 
focus of attention. The focus is said to hold the items in the highest state of accessibility 
because it pertains to the items presently in use for a cognitive task. Under this definition, 
the focus could be equated, at least partially, with Pashler’s (1992) cognitive bottleneck 
in that it holds the items currently attended in order to carry out a cognitive task. 
However, a more recent controversy surrounds this definition as some researchers posit 
that the focus is actually better conceived as a sub-process within a broader cognitive 
bottleneck. At the heart of the matter is the capacity limit of the focus of attention. Some 
researchers support a definition encompassing multiple items (Cowan, 2001; Gilchrist & 
Cowan, 2011), whereas others maintain a single-item narrow focus is the greatest degree 
of item accessibility relative to items outside of the focus (Garavan, 1998; McElree, 
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1998) or to other items in a broad focus (Oberauer & Kliegl, 2006; Oberauer & Bialkova, 
2009). 
 The theoretical limits and specific qualifications for what the focus of attention 
does and how it does it are important for practical application. This mechanism has 
implications for the larger concept of working memory (particularly working memory 
span), which has further implications for general fluid intelligence (Engle, Kane, & 
Tuholski, 1999; Conway, Kane, & Engle, 2003; Cowan et al., 2005; Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, 
Jonides, & Perrig, 2008), attention deficit hyper-activity disorder (ADHD; Klingberg, 
Forssberg, & Westerberg, 2002), and emotion regulation (Schmeichel, Volokhov, & 
Demaree, 2008) among others. Practical application of these relationships with working 
memory is difficult without a framework for understanding the underlying mechanisms 
of working memory (e.g., the focus of attention). Researchers, clinicians, and businesses 
have already begun to create brain training programs based on, as yet, the incompletely 
understood concept of working memory (e.g., Lumosity by Lumos Labs and BrainHQ by 
Posit Science). In essence, attempting to understand how working memory relates to 
ADHD without first understanding how the focus of attention works is akin to attempting 
to understand how photosynthesis relates to oxygen production without first 
understanding how chlorophyll works. The basics direct the larger issues. 
Evidence of this need for understanding the most basic mechanisms prior to 
theorizing about the larger concepts abounds. The current controversy regarding working 
memory training and its supposed benefits, or lack thereof, is one example. Evidence 
supporting working memory training as a ‘cure’ for ADHD (among other purported 
benefits) has been shown by some (Klingberg, Forssberg, & Westerberg, 2002) and has 
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even taken a hold in the popular media. Yet other researchers have attempted to cull the 
spread of this idea as they find very little benefit of working memory training outside of 
improvements on related working memory tasks (Melby-Lervåg, & Hulme, 2013; 
Shipstead, Redick, & Engle, 2012). A better understanding of underlying mechanisms, 
e.g., the focus of attention, would help inform views about practical applications of 
working memory techniques. To better understand working memory, it is necessary to 
understand the procedures used to measure the focus of attention. 
Measuring the Focus of Attention 
In the major line of cognitive research related to the focus of attention, various 
researchers have used access time (measured by reaction time) as an indicator of an 
item’s presence in the focus of attention, or its absence from that focus (Garavan, 1998; 
Gilchrist & Cowan, 2011; McElree, 1998; Oberauer, 2002, 2005; Oberauer & Bialkova, 
2009, 2011). In the research conclusions of the soon to be described updating task, access 
time is further utilized to dissociate information within the focus as opposed to the more 
classical interpretation, which considers access time only as a measure that differentiates 
items of different processes. Here, the interpretation of one measurement tool based on 
this retrieval-speed logic, object switch costs, is re-examined (Garavan, 1998; Oberauer, 
2002). This project attempts to ascertain the most parsimonious interpretation of how 
object switch costs inform upon working memory organization. As such, it is necessary 
to review the measurement tool of interest, i.e., object switch costs. 
Object Switch Costs 
 Within working memory theory, there is a theoretical debate concerning whether 
the focus of attention can hold multiple items, or if one of those items is more highly 
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accessible than the rest (see Figure 1). The main method that has led to results supporting 
the latter assertion is the examination of object switch costs.  Object switch costs occur 
when several objects must be held in mind concurrently while one of them is updated. It 
refers to the presence of a longer reaction time (RT) when a task’s target object is 
different from the previous trial, compared to trials in which the same object is responded 
to again. 
The type of switch cost examined here, modeled after Oberauer (2002), is 
illustrated in the left-hand column of Figure 2. The trials are presented in blocks. At the 
beginning of every block, the participant memorizes a set of digits at different box 
locations (either 2 or 3 locations, in different conditions). After that, several arithmetic 
updates are to be made one at a time to be applied to the digit that had appeared in a box. 
When the operation is presented in one box the others remain blank throughout a 
sequence until each is selected in turn for an arithmetic update. The answer is to be 
produced and the updated set is to be kept in mind for the subsequent trial.  For example, 
in the right-hand column of Figure 1, the participant should remember 5, 3, 4; then add 2 
to the second object and consequently press the 5 key; then remember the result, 5, 5, 4; 
then apply the next operation to whatever object is indicated, etc. The typical finding is 
that the RT to yield the next answer will be shorter on average if the same object in the 
set is updated again (e.g., in the illustration, an arithmetic change of the second box) than 
if a different object in the set is updated (an arithmetic change to the first or third box).  
That difference in RT is the object switch cost.   
Object switch costs have implications for theories of the focus of attention, which 
are considered below.  First, though, it is helpful to consider some of the desirable 
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properties of tasks that examine object switch costs, such as the one used here. 
Methodology for object switch cost studies can require continuous updating of multiple 
items of information. This continuous and fast-paced updating impedes mechanisms that 
could provide a modus operandi of retaining the information outside of the focus of 
attention, e.g., a temporary long-term store such as an activated long-term mechanism. 
Updating accomplishes this by continuously changing the memoranda in order that 
mnemonics such as rehearsal and chunking of the items becomes impractical (Naveh-
Benjamin & Jonides, 1986). A rapid pace of the task further impedes memory-improving 
mechanisms that would require assistance from a secondary mechanism (e.g., activated 
long-term memory). Simply put, updating tasks examining the switch costs of items are 
thought to be completed by participants without relying on secondary systems of working 
memory. This implies that the observed effects can be assumed to have to do only with 
the focus of attention.   
Theories of the Focus of Attention  
Single-Item Focus 
The classic account for the additional time present in these object switch costs is 
that it indicates additional processing time needed for the focus of attention to replace its 
single-item with a new, different item (Garavan, 1998; Oberauer, 2002). Research 
investigating the possibility of a primary item in the focus of attention is generally set up 
within the framework of looking for one (i.e., methodology that investigates if one item is 
different from others). Pashler (1992) showed that when attempting to accomplish 
multiple tasks at once there arose a diminished ability to accomplish one or both of them. 
Object switch costs could be considered a replication of this effect at the more finite item-
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level within a single task when more than a single item is held in mind during the lone 
task (Garavan, 1998; Oberauer, 2002). The predominant theoretical interpretation of 
object switch costs is that they indicate that a single item receives priority in the focus of 
attention (Oberauer & Hein, 2012). 
 The three-embedded-components model (Oberauer, 2002, 2009) posits three 
component systems of working memory, one within another, corresponding to three 
distinguishable levels of item-accessibility. The three components of this model (in 
ascending order of item-accessibility) are the activated part of long-term memory, the 
region of direct-access, and the focus of attention. The prior two components of this 
model correlate to two processes of a multiple-item model to be discussed later, whereas 
the final component posits a sub-process with a single-item capacity. However, this final 
component shares a name with a multiple-item process of the to-be-described model so 
here the latter two components will be described as the broad focus and the narrow focus, 
respectively, to simplify terminology for model comparison. These same terms were used 
by Oberauer and Hein (2012) for similar model comparison. 
 The activated part of long-term memory here describes a non-capacity limited 
‘stand-by’ component for information that is not currently, but may become, task 
relevant. The broad focus serves a similar function with the added distinctions of greater 
accessibility of items and a capacity limitation of about four items. The narrow focus is 
the locus of the notion of a primary memory item held in greater accessibility than all 
other items. Perhaps the best-articulated support for a single-item narrow focus is that of 
Oberauer and Bialkova (2009) in which multiple items could only be incorporated into 
this component if they were chunked into a single unit (e.g., the three items F – B – I, can 
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be held in the single chunk FBI). Chunking, in the models discussed here, is not 
considered a point of contention as it is accepted by both models (i.e., multiple-item 
focus models allow for chunks to be considered as types of items and the ability to retain 
a single chunk composed of multiple items is not taken as evidence for or against the 
capacity to hold multiple, separate items).   
Oberauer and Bialkova (2009) found that when two items were processed on 
every trial (e.g., in that study, colors to be mentally converted to numbers in order to 
resolve an equation such as ‘brown plus blue’) the pattern of results suggested that switch 
cost was not diminished by updating only part of a chunk.  Thus, the cost of one item 
switching to a different color was just as high as the cost of both items switching. 
Repetition of part of a chunk would not be helpful. This suggests the two items formed a 
single chunk indistinguishable from a single item. Furthermore, there is evidence that two 
items of similar kind (e.g., 2 digits or 2 spatial locations) cannot be maintained together 
in the focus of attention without resulting in cross-talk that interferes with memory for the 
items (Oberauer & Bialkova, 2011). This evidence is further explored in the next section. 
Multiple-Item Focus 
 Alternative to the single-item focus account, another group of researchers has 
theorized that the focus of attention is able to accommodate multiple items. These 
multiple items, about 3 to 5, are suggested to simultaneously occupy the focus even when 
there is no reliance on supplementary mechanisms such as sensory memory or verbal 
rehearsal (Cowan, 2001; Gilchrist & Cowan, 2011; Bae & Flombaum, 2013). The 
theoretical viewpoint that there is a limited but plural capacity in memory is 
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longstanding. Indeed, this same estimate was first numerated nearly a century and a half 
ago (Jevons, 1871) under a different term (i.e., immediate memory, James, 1885).  
The embedded-processes model (Cowan, 1999) considers the memory system as a 
whole to contain long-term memory (LTM), an activated portion of long-term memory 
(aLTM), and the focus of attention(FoA). Processes in this model are referred to as 
embedded as the memory system is conceived as a unitary system with each process 
acting within a larger process (i.e., the FoA acts within aLTM, which acts within LTM). 
This is contrary to a model of multiple mechanisms that operate apart from one another, 
such as the Baddeley and Hitch (1974) multiple-component model.  
The embedded-processes model does not posit the presence of a further sub-
process in the narrow focus. Instead, in its simplest form, it considers the several items 
within the focus of attention to be relatively equally accessible. However, these items 
must be considered able to be somewhat differentially accessible given evidence from 
several sources (see Cowan, 2001).  An important source of evidence in this regard is the 
presence of object switch costs in updating tasks (as well as incongruent data from some 
other tasks, e.g., visual search). The primary difference between single-item vs. multiple-
item focus capacity is that the latter does not view the one item utilized to be functionally 
different from the other items, as does the single-item account. Instead, the multiple-item 
theory accounts for the observation of object switch costs as evidence that the multiple 
items can differ in strength or priority within the focus (Cowan, 2011).  
For example, the previously described method of Oberauer and Bialkova (2009) 
that supported a single-item account has also been utilized to show support for a multiple-
item focus given different functional task demands. Gilchrist & Cowan (2011), using a 
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slightly modified procedure, obtained data that presented a pattern of object switch costs 
more compatible with a multiple-item account of the focus. Specifically, whereas 
Oberauer and Bialkova found no evidence for a difference in the object switch costs 
when a partial chunk update was made compared to a full chunk update (a result 
interpreted as evidence of two items chunked into one), Gilchrist and Cowan found such 
a difference in switch costs between a partial and full chunk update. While the initial 
study examined only a single attribute (i.e., color), the latter manipulated multiple 
attributes which could not be easily chunked together (i.e., color and shape). This 
multiple-attribute procedure required a learned association between a shape and letter 
(e.g., square and W) and a second learned association between a color and number (e.g., 
blue and 4). At test, participants were then shown a shape and color (e.g., square and 
blue) and asked to identify the corresponding letter-number combination (e.g., W4). 
Identification was accomplished by a mouse-click on a grid of lettered rows and 
numbered columns. A second experiment confirmed alterations to the grid pattern did not 
affect results. Gilchrist and Cowan found that updating only one of two items in memory 
on a subsequent trial resulted in less of a switch cost than when both items were updated. 
Recall this was not the case in Oberauer and Bialkova. This suggests that, based on 
functional task demands, two items can be inextricably linked in the focus of attention as 
a single chunk (insofar as reaction time goes). When chunking is not possible, however, 
both items can still be held as separate individual items. Similarly, the previously 
mentioned Oberauer and Bialkova (2011) showed that the focus of attention can expand 
beyond a single item to accommodate two items provided sufficient task-fluency 
obtained through extensive practice (i.e., as task proficiency is achieved, theoretically 
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diminishing the resources necessary per item, the focus can accommodate multiple 
items). This effect was only observed, however, if the two items were of a dissimilar kind 
(i.e., a digit and a spatial location, but not 2 digits or 2 spatial locations).  
These many examples may make it difficult to determine just what it is about 
these two models that is different. After all, the most recently provided citation presents 
evidence of multiple items in the focus while concluding that multiple items can be held 
in the focus without violating the assumptions of the single-item position. To restate, the 
primary discrepancy between the alternate views of the focus is whether or not a 
functional difference exists between one primary item above all others. In this most 
recent case, that functional difference is item kind. For this case, the single-item account 
allows multiple items that are functionally different such that if required to maintain three 
items, one digit and two spatial items, only the single digit would be able to occupy the 
narrow focus. The multiple-item account does not preclude the possibility of the two 
spatial items, or even all three items, held in the focus concurrently. 
Essentially, the three-embedded-components model (Oberauer, 2002) is derived 
from the embedded-processes model (Cowan, 1999). The single-item focus account 
reforms the traditional idea of the focus into a sub-process within a broader focus to 
account for the incongruent object switch cost data yielded from updating tasks (McElree 
& Dosher, 1989; Garavan, 1998; Oberauer, 2002; Oberauer & Kliegl, 2006). This sub-
process then constitutes a particularly highly accessible primary item, the updated item, 
whereas the multiple-item focus is relegated to a level of working memory less active 
than the single-item focus but more active than the activated part of long-term memory 
(Figure 1). 
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There must be an explanation for how it is that functionally similar items can be 
said to occupy the same level of accessibility in a multiple-item focus despite RT 
differences observed in the object switch cost paradigm. This is the driving question of 
the present project. This project attempts to ascertain the most parsimonious 
interpretation of the working memory system’s method of organizing items within a 
capacity limited focus of attention. Under investigation is if and how allotment of 
individual items’ attentional resources is disparate. A single-item narrow focus account 
predicts a primary item can differ in attentional resources whereas the other items remain 
similar to one another. A multiple-item account could be supported by multiple results.  
In essence, there are two main multiple-item possibilities: all of the items are held with 
equal priority (contrary to common interpretation of object switch costs) or all of the 
items are held with unequal priority (as opposed to the single-item account that one item 
has priority over other items held equally to one another). 
The Present Study 
 The present study uses an updating task (described in detail in the experiment 
methods) previously interpreted as evidence of a single-item focus of attention due to the 
presence of object switch costs. Multiple items are required to be held in mind with one 
item updated at a time. Past research (e.g., Oberauer, 2002) has determined that the RT 
provided for any particular object-update is greater when that update is to a different item 
(i.e., a switch) than on the previous trial compared to updating the same item as a 
previous trial. This study examines raw RT data from this task without changing the task 
itself. Therefore, through a more in-depth examination of data always there, yet not 
recorded, it is asserted an interpretation of object-switch costs as evidence of a single-
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item focus of attention is a result of examining only the surface of much deeper data 
source. 
On the basis of equal priority, it would be difficult to explain why one item 
appears functionally different than the others with regard to the object switch cost effect. 
For the present study (refer back to Figure 2) an equal priority account would predict a 
difference between the object switch cost magnitude depending on the number of items 
(i.e., the 2-box trial would present smaller object switch costs than that of the 3-box trial). 
This contrasts the single-item position that a primary item is functionally different from 
the others. The only change between trial conditions is the primary item went from being 
regarded as ‘primary-of-two’ to ‘primary-of-three’. However, the single-item account 
could predict the greater switch cost magnitude based on item interference. While the 
single-item model necessitates a primary item, the specific benefit of this item could be 
diminished by 3 rather than 2 items jockeying for this position of greater accessibility. 
Unequal priority is more likely to be a valid interpretation of object switch cost 
data. Possible theoretical interpretations for this prediction include a discrete-slot model 
of resource sharing in the focus of attention (Zhang & Luck, 2008; Anderson, Vogel, & 
Awh, 2011) or gradated representations (Bae & Flombaum, 2013). Organizing the focus 
of attention into multiple discrete slots may appear to be a similar account to a single-
item focus as, viewed from an overarching level, these two accounts appear to be 
negligibly different in that each provides resources in some focus (broad and narrow, or 
sole) for several items. However, the multiple-item position allows for more flexibility in 
how the multiple items are maintained. Assume for the moment the focus has the 
resources to maintain up to 5 discrete slots. The single-item model would allow for 
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resource division only into a primary item (the narrow focus) and secondary items, which 
must be allotted equal resources under this interpretation. The multiple-item discrete-slot 
account does not dismiss the possibility that a single item may be allotted the resources 
for all 5 slots, that 3 items may comprise all focus resources, or indeed that a single 
updated item can take up 2 slots while the remaining items each take up 1 slot. This last 
configuration would result in a shorter RT for the single updated item observationally 
identical to the single-item sub-process account. 
Cowan (2001) assumed that there is a continuum of priorities, up to the capacity 
limit.  For example, it has been suggested that items in a short list can share the focus of 
attention when the list must be scanned in memory to determine whether a probe item is 
present in the list (Sternberg, 1966). Under that assumption, however, it cannot be 
assumed that presence in the focus of attention is all-or-none with identical resource 
allotment between list items. There exists an RT dependence (when scanning for a probe 
item) on the number of items in a list (up to a capacity limit; see Burrows & Okada, 
1975) such that there can be stronger representations of items when there are fewer items 
in the scanned list. Similarly, in research on visual array comparisons, Zhang and Luck 
(2008) were able to fit their data only with a model in which, when there are fewer items 
to be remembered than available slots in working memory, an item can be represented in 
greater precision by taking up more than one slot.  In these theoretical views, there is a 
fixed capacity limit but, within the limit, it is possible for items to be represented at 
different levels of priority. Even when only one item is relevant, as in the present study, 
its level of activation or strength in the focus of attention could theoretically vary. 
Gradated representations can occur, even independent of discrete slots, so long as the 
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number of items remains under the capacity limit (Bae & Flombaum, 2013). Strict 
capacity limits for multiple-item focus models drop as low as 3 (Anderson, Vogel, & 
Awh, 2001), therefore it is unlikely the present study will surpass the threshold for the 
possibility of obtaining gradated representations. Were a greater number of items used in 
the experiments described below, the possibility of obtaining data in-line with this 
possible explanation would diminish, if not disappear completely, thereby decreasing its 
predictive power. 
 
Chapter 2: Experiment 1 
 
In Experiment 1 of the present study, we created an opportunity for the priority of 
an item to change throughout 1 to 3 repetitions of the same target before a possible 
switch.  If switch costs reflect the presence of an item in the focus of attention, and if 
only one level of strength of that presence is possible, then repeating multiple trials with 
the same object as the target should not change the magnitude of the switch cost. The 
target remains the solitary item in the focus of attention.  It must be noted that motor or 
simple procedural knowledge cannot account for increased magnitude of switch costs in 
the experimental design shown in Figure 2, inasmuch as the response differs from trial to 
trial even when the object being updated remains the same.  If, however, there are 
different levels of strength of an item’s presence in the focus of attention, then repeating 
the same target multiple times might be expected to increase the resource allocation to 
that item within a multiple-item focus, thereby increasing the subsequent switch cost. 
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It was possible to find certain key sequences of trials within the results to be 
compared.  With letters A and B representing specific object locations, the important 
comparisons included the final trial in each of the following trial sequences: AA versus 
AB (the object switch cost as traditionally measured); AAA versus AAB; and AAAA versus 
AAAB.  If the source of object switch costs is the inclusion of A in an all-or-none, single-
item focus of attention; all sequences should produce equivalent switch costs on RT.  
Switch costs of different magnitudes depending on pre-switch repetitions, however, 
indicate item A is being allotted additional resources as the repetition count increases. 
This cannot be explained with a single-item account as the updated item should have 
achieved presence in the narrow focus in the initial AA versus AB sequence (according to 
the classical single-item interpretation of object switch costs). A multiple-item account 
allows for the possibility of allotment of additional resources to an item as it becomes 
more task-relevant. 
Method 
Participants 
Introductory psychology course credit was awarded to 41 participants (31 female, 
11 male; mean age 18.75 years, SD=0.80).  They were native speakers of English.  Four 
additional participants were excluded because they did not make any correct responses in 
at least one condition. 
Apparatus, Stimuli, and Procedure 
The experiment was programmed in E-Prime (Psychology Software Tools, 
Pittsburgh, PA) and conducted on computers with one participant per sound-attenuated 
booth.  Blocks of 12 trials were presented, each beginning with two or three locations 
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marked with boxes, each filled with a digit to be remembered, as shown in Figure 2.  
Each trial block began with a screen informing the participant that a series was 
upcoming.  The procedure included 5 practice blocks (two blocks with 2-box trials and 
three blocks with 3-box trials, in a random order) followed by 34 test blocks, with 12 
trials per block.  The order of 2- and 3-box test trial blocks was random, with 17 blocks 
of each type. The target location was randomly selected with replacement on each trial in 
each block, eliminating any possibility of using expectancy to prepare for the next trial.  
On each trial in a block, one digit was to be updated and the updating response RT was 
recorded. 
Each box within the set of two or three (depending on the trial block) was 40 mm 
high and 60 mm wide, and pairs of boxes were laterally separated by 13 mm.  Digits 
presented in the boxes were about 8 mm high and 5 mm wide.  Participants had as long as 
they wanted to memorize the two or three digits presented at the beginning of each trial.  
When they pressed a key to continue, the digits disappeared and one randomly-selected 
box was filled with an arithmetic operation (e.g., +2 or -3) such that the result remained 
in the range of 1 through 9.  The required response was to press the appropriate number 
key from the line above the QWERTY keyboard, as quickly as possible without making 
an error.  As in Oberauer (2005), feedback for a correct response was a 700-Hz tone for 
50 ms followed by 50 ms of silence; feedback for an incorrect response was a 300-Hz 
tone for 100 ms.  Participants had the chance for several breaks between trial blocks, with 
a screen indicating that they should press a key to continue when ready.   
RT results were calculated only for trial sequences for which the responses had 
been correct since the beginning of the trial block.  Individual trial RTs less than 0.5 s 
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were excluded because they were thought to represent primarily guesses, and those 
longer than 10 s were excluded because they were thought to represent inattention to the 
task.  The restrictions on RT eliminated only 0.3% of trials that otherwise would have 
been included.   
Results 
Proportions correct were fairly high, as shown in Table 1, and RTs were 
examined only up to the point preceding an error in the sequence.  Given that there are no 
theoretical predictions for the pattern of proportions correct, they were not analyzed 
further. 
The RTs and accuracies are shown in Table 1, and the calculated switch costs 
(switched- target RTs minus same-target RTs) are depicted in Figure 3.  The switch costs 
were entered into an ANOVA with two within-participant factors:  the number of boxes 
in each trial in the block, and the number of repetitions of the pre-switch target location 
(1, 2, or 3).  The latter factor was not patterned into the experiment (in order to avoid 
predictability of the targets) but occurred by chance, and was measured wherever it 
happened to occur.   
As shown in Figure 3, there was a main effect of the number of repetitions on 
switch costs, F(2,80)=4.16, p<.05, ηp
2
=.09.  Newman-Keuls tests indicated that the 1- and 
3-repetition trials differed from one another at p<.05.  There was also a large effect of the 
number of boxes, F(1,40)=22.58; switch costs were much smaller for 2-box trials 
(M=375 ms, SEM=52) than for 3-box trials (M=817 ms, SEM=103).  Thus, the effect of 
repetitions of the target location on the switch cost increased monotonically. The lack of 
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a significant interaction (ηp
2
=.01) between these two factors will become a main focus of 
Experiment 2, which examines an unexpected trend in the data of Experiment 1. 
 
Chapter 3: Discussion 
 
Presence of an item in the focus of attention serves as a good explanation for why 
there is an RT savings when a target location is used repeatedly across trials, despite the 
fact that the updated response still differs from one trial to the next (Oberauer, 2002, 
2005).  Yet, the present findings show that there must be more subtlety to that argument.  
We found multiple-repetition effects on RT, with a switch cost that increases following 
more repetitions with the same object, at least up to three such repetitions (Figure 3).  Of 
particular interest, contrary to previous accounts of switch costs obtained from updating 
tasks, is when the definitive cost of switching actually occurs. As noted earlier, the 
traditional measure of switch cost utilizes only the AA versus AB trials. A cursory glance 
at the Experiment 1 RT data in Table 1 shows a flaw in this interpretation. Though an 
increase in RT on switch trials can be seen solely within these trials, the more intriguing 
effect can be seen when comparing these trials to the AAA and AAB trials (column 2 in 
Table 1). The switch trials for these two conditions remain similar to each other whereas 
the non-switch trials show a decrease in RT. Therefore, there is technically not a greater 
switch cost here but a repetition benefit. When subtracting out the difference between RT 
for non-switch and switch trials this effect is lost and interpreted as an increased switch 
cost (see Figure 3). A ‘true’ object switch cost does, however, turn up in the remaining 3-
repetition trials (i.e., AAAA and AAAB). For these trials no further repetition benefit is 
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observed and a pure increase in the RT for switch trials is observed for the first time. Two 
separate mechanisms appear to be at work within what has previously been considered a 
unitary effect defined as object switch costs. The observed increase in magnitude of 
switch cost from multiple repetitions was expected and serves as evidence for a multiple-
item account of the focus of attention. The presence of multiple mechanisms apparently 
at work resulting in a fundamental change in the genesis of the RT differences was not 
predicted. More research specifically designed to investigate these effects, including 
Experiment 2 presented here, is necessary to identify what change in the theoretical 
account best explains this finding.  Several possibilities are as follows. 
Multi-slot Focus Account 
Cowan (2001) and others have proposed that the focus of attention might hold 
more than one item at a time (cf. Gilchrist & Cowan, 2011; Oberauer & Bialkova, 2011).  
If so, then the focus of attention might also be capable of including a varying amount of 
resources for a single relevant item, perhaps by using more than one slot for the same 
item (Zhang & Luck, 2008).  The application to the present data would be that the focus 
of attention becomes more committed to the target item as it is repeated in multiple trials, 
until some maximal gradation point is reached (i.e., no further resources are available to 
be allotted). Presumably this point would occur with 3 to 5 slots committed to the same 
item (Cowan, 2001).  Each slot committed to the target object would contribute neural 
activation that would converge on a rapid and high-fidelity use of the item in the focus of 
attention, increasingly so as more slots are committed to the target object.  
Only at the point of maximal gradation could the single-item focus account of 
Oberauer (2002) explain these data, thereby rendering this interpretation incomplete. At 
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the maximal gradation point the single updated item has been allotted all of the resources 
available and while further repetitions do not further diminish RT, a switch to a new item 
requires additional time relative to both an additional repetition and a switch with fewer 
repetitions.  This is the object switch cost traditionally viewed as evidence for a single-
item focus account. Essentially then, the narrow focus within a broad focus account 
would be a functional process rather than an ever-present structural component. This 
arrangement would be supported within the framework of Oberauer and Hein (2012). 
This interpretation, however, still requires a mechanism to explain the repetition 
benefit effect. One possible interpretation is that an episodic buffer (Baddeley, 2000) is 
able to buoy the single-item on the initial trials by incorporating cognitive input (i.e., 
resources to be allocated) from multiple systems of memory. This episodic buffer, here, 
would have exhausted its potential benefit by the 3-repetition trials resulting in no further 
RT benefit observed after this point. Taken together, this process of multiple mechanisms 
could be viewed as beginning with a multiple-item focus (Cowan, 2001), followed by 
resource-sharing (Anderson, Vogel, & Awh, 2011; Zhang & Luck, 2008) accomplished 
through an episodic buffer (Baddeley, 2000) until one slot in a multiple-item focus 
becomes functionally unique at a point of maximal gradation resulting in the necessity of 
additional processing time to reintegrate the items maintained in a broad focus to again be 
utilized (Oberauer & Hein, 2012). 
Proactive Interference Account 
Another possibility is that the switch costs occur because recently used targets vie 
for attentional resources.  Indeed, there is some evidence that there are lasting effects of 
recent targets, or lag effects (Oberauer, 2006).  In the present study, the more times the 
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same target location is presented in a row, the less recent and hence less interfering the 
competing target locations would become.     
In one possible variant of this explanation, the last few target objects would stay 
within the focus of attention with the prior objects interfering with the current object 
within that focus.  Among researchers who appear to accept that there is a multiple-item, 
capacity-limited region of working memory associated with the focus of attention (either 
directly in that focus or just surrounding it), most have found little or no proactive 
interference among items (Cowan, Johnson, & Saults, 2005; Halford, Maybery, & Bain, 
1988; Oberauer & Vockenberg, 2009). There is, however, a recent exception in which a 
higher amount of repetition of materials was used (Carroll et al., 2010), and that high 
amount of repetition of items does seem applicable to the present study, in which the 
responses always were single digits 1-9.  
Long-term Memory Representations 
Last, it may be theoretically possible that RT switch costs do not reflect the 
presence of an item in the focus of attention after all.  Instead, for example, it is possible 
that a long-term memory representation of the target item is built up, binding its location 
to its successive history of digits, and that long-term representation becomes stronger or 
more accessible in the immediate task with more successive repetitions of the same target 
object (cf. Cowan, 1995, 1999; Ericsson & Kintsch, 1995; Unsworth & Engle, 2007). It is 
hard to understand how this might work in the present context, however.  As the 
repetitions progress, the number of digits associated with the current target increase, 
presumably causing more proactive interference, making responding more difficult, not 
easier.   
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Chapter 4: Experiment 2 
 
Given that several possible explanations of these results are viable, a second 
experiment was run to confirm the results of Experiment 1. The main inadequacy from 
analyses based solely on the results of Experiment 1 is the apparent interplay between 
multiple underlying mechanisms. The effects of an object switch cost are as expected for 
a gradated focus of attention when measured by the traditional RTn² - RTn¹ equation (see 
Figure 3). However, examining RT without subtracting out the object switch cost shows 
two separate effects (see Table 1). From pre-switch repetition 1 to 2 there is a decrease in 
overall RT when the object does not switch (for both 2 and 3 box trials), whereas 
switching has no effect. Conversely, from pre-switch repetition 2 to 3 there is an increase 
in overall RT on switch trials (for both 2 and 3 box trials), whereas further repetition has 
no effect. These two separate effects converge when using the traditional object switch 
cost analysis. 
Experiment 2 further examines the locus of this difference with one minor 
methodological adjustment. It is impossible to control every factor at once and the second 
experiment controls a slightly different factor than the first experiment.  In the first 
experiment, the randomization scheme resulted in the equal likelihood of operating on 
each box.  For the three-box case, this meant that two thirds of the trials were switch 
trials.  In the second experiment, in contrast, the randomization scheme resulted in the 
equal likelihood of switch and no-switch trials (see Figure 2).  
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Additionally, the observed dual nature of the genesis of the switch cost was not 
predicted for Experiment 1 (i.e., in the raw RT data, the repetition benefit followed by a 
true switch cost as repetition count increased). As such, the amount of viable data to 
support these effects is limited, particularly for the latter repetition trials. An error on a 
trial terminated data collection for the remainder of each block, therefore the number of 
data points for each increasing repetition case was diminished given the increased 
likelihood of errors occurring later in a block. Therefore, Experiment 2 slightly alters the 
conditions to test generalizability of the effect as well as adds more data to provide more 
robust results to confirm Experiment 1 had not merely been an effect of noise in limited 
data. The latter purpose was accomplished by increasing the number of trial blocks from 
34 to 50. 
Similar results for the 2-box condition would act as a pure replication of 
Experiment 1 and results of the 3-box condition will provide greater depth for analysis of 
the individual effects of repetition and switch. In making one box more task-relevant it 
can be inferred whether the repetition effect disappears for pre-switch repetition trials 2 
to 3 because (1) that item has reached the maximal gradation point and can be afforded 
no further resources by the focus of attention, or (2) that the cognitive demands are such 
that it is beneficial to allocate resource slots of the other two boxes to the one in use 
(thereby pushing an item out of the focus and into a less accessible area). A replication of 
the results from Experiment 1 are conducive to the former whereas the latter would 
predict even greater resource allocation to the repetition box in 3-box trials as this box is 
now more likely to be further selected than in Experiment 1. The presence of a longer RT 
only on switch trials following multiple (two to three) repetitions would provide support 
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for a gradated multiple-item focus. Conventional object switch costs (e.g., Oberauer, 
2002; Oberauer & Kliegl, 2006) could be described as an effect of additional resource 
allotment within the focus, whereas the true switch cost is present only when an item 
deemed comparably task-irrelevant to other items must be accessed from a less highly 
accessible area of working memory (e.g., activated long-term memory). Were the direct-
access region (i.e., the broad focus) of Oberauer (2002) truly a separate capacity limited 
mechanism within the focus of attention, it too should show a true switch cost, rather than 
apparent switch cost artifacts from repetition effects. 
Participants 
Introductory psychology course credit was awarded to 40 naïve participants (26 
female, 14 male; mean age 19.21 years, SD=1.80).  They were native speakers of 
English. 
Apparatus, Stimuli, and Procedure 
The procedure for Experiment 2 was identical to that of Experiment 1 with two  
exceptions. Selection for 3-box trials was based on a 50% likelihood of each trial to 
switch to a new box. Therefore, the repetition box was 50% likely to be selected again 
and each of the unutilized boxes had a 25% chance of selection. Additionally, the total 
number of trial blocks was increased from 34 to 50 to reduce the chance that observed 
effects were due merely to noise in a limited data set. 
Results 
 A 2x2x3ANOVA confirmed that Experiment condition (i.e., the different switch 
probability for each experiment) did not have an interacting effect on Switch/NoSwitch 
condition, F(1,480)=.13, ns, nor on number of repetitions, F(2,480)=.42, ns. Likewise, 
 26 
 
there was no three-way interaction, F(2,480)=.32, ns. Therefore, all data from both 
experiments was combined for all further analyses to provide a more robust data set from 
which any effects could be examined. 
 The RTs and accuracies are shown in Table 2, and the calculated switch costs are 
depicted in Figure 4. As with Experiment 1 results alone, the switch costs from the 
complete data set, N=81, were entered into an ANOVA with two within-participant 
factors: number of boxes in a trial and number of pre-switch repetitions. The expanded 
data set confirmed the main effect of number of repetitions on switch costs, 
F(2,480)=5.82, p<.01, ηp
2
=.02. Newman-Keuls tests indicated that the 1- repetition 
condition differed from both the 2- (p<.05) and 3- (p<.01) repetition conditions. There 
was also a large main effect of number of boxes, F(1,480)=39.18, p<.001, ηp
2
=.08; switch 
costs were much smaller for 2-box trials (M=391.18ms, SEM=29.15) than for 3-box trials 
(M=746.42ms, SEM=49.39). 
 However, when the box number conditions were analyzed in separate ANOVAs, 
the effect of repetitions on switch cost was only significant for the 3-box condition, 
F(2,240)=4.31, p<.05, ηp
2
=.03. Newman-Keuls test indicated that the 1- repetition 
condition was marginally different from the 2- repetition condition (p=.053) and 
significantly different from the 3- repetition condition (p<.05). There was not a 
significant effect of repetition on switch cost for the 2-box condition, F(2,240)=1.56, ns. 
 Further examination of the overall RTs (i.e., mean RT prior to subtracting out the 
switch costs) is intended to examine the previously noted apparent dual underlying 
effects (i.e., a repetition benefit from 1- repetition to 2- repetitions and a ‘true’ switch 
cost from 2- repetitions to 3- repetitions) driving the presence of the object switch cost 
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effect. A 2x2x3 ANOVA was run on number of boxes, Switch/NoSwitch condition, and 
number of repetitions, respectively. Overall mean RT is depicted in Figure 5. There was a 
main effect of box condition, F(1,960)=58.58,p<001, ηp
2
=.06, and Switch/NoSwitch 
condition, F(1,960)=217.06,p<001, ηp
2
=.18. Interactions were present for box condition 
by Switch/NoSwitch condition, F(1,960)=21.17, p<.001, and, crucially, for 
Switch/NoSwitch by repetitions, F(2,960)=3.14, p<.05. The latter interaction is indicative 
of the predicted dual pattern of the repetition effect on RT dependent on whether a 
particular trial is a switch or no-switch. 
 As with the switch cost analyses, separate ANOVAs were run for the box number 
conditions. The 2-box condition failed to obtain a significant interaction effect of 
Switch/NoSwitch by repetition on RT, F(2,480)=.58, ns. The 3-box condition obtained 
only a marginally significant interaction of Switch/NoSwitch by repetition on RT, 
F(2,480)=2.76, p=.06. 
 
Chapter 5: General Discussion 
 
 The data presented in this paper have implications for determining the most 
parsimonious theoretical organization of working memory. The two main theoretical 
accounts discussed have only one key difference up for debate: the focus of attention. In 
the past, the mere existence of an object switch cost effect in RT data has been inferred as 
evidence for a focus of attention that is able to maintain only a single item (or chunk) at 
any moment. This is a logical and perfectly reasonable interpretation of the 
aforementioned effect. An accepted definition of the term focus of attention under the 
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similar theoretical accounts of Cowan (2001) and Oberauer (2002) is information 
maintained in the highest possible state of accessibility. It follows from this that a cost of 
switching between multiple items indicates that a single item is always more accessible 
than other items, which must be peripheral in some way. 
Oberauer (2002) accounts for this seemingly peripheral aspect with the inclusion 
of a region of direct access (i.e., a broad focus) in a minor alteration of Cowan’s (2001) 
embedded-processes model of working memory. Essentially, Oberauer’s embedded-
components model accounts for a hitherto unexplainable phenomenon with one minor 
addition to the overall structure in a similar vein to the addition of the episodic buffer to 
Baddeley’s (2000) multiple-component model. The data presented here, however, 
provide some initial indication that this minor addition does not account for the full 
breadth of possible switch cost effects. 
A clear trend of increasing switch costs as number of pre-switch repetitions 
increased was found in both the 2-box and 3-box trial conditions (see Figure 4). This 
trend was shown to be significant for the 3-box condition but not the 2-box condition. 
The lack of a significant increasing switch cost effect in the 2-box condition cannot be 
explained solely with the present data set but several possibilities could be investigated in 
the future. One such explanation is that with only two items to be remembered, the 
difference between a single-item focus and a multiple-item focus that can gradate items is 
functionally indistinct as measured by object switch costs. This explanation is unlikely 
given the clear trend in the data which shows that an item in use can be afforded 
additional resources following multiple repetitions. Another possible explanation is that 
variability from individual differences is superseding the effect. This hypothesis could be 
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easily tested by separating participants into groups based on some individual difference in 
common (e.g., working memory span). Multiple groups based on common working 
memory span could reduce within-group variability providing a significantly increasing 
switch cost separately for high-span participants and low-span participants, but not for 
both groups together. 
The results of the 3-box condition are much less ambiguous. These data give clear 
initial evidence that switch costs effects are better explained by a multiple-item account 
of the focus of attention than a single-item account. Object switch costs are almost 
uniformly interpreted as evidence for a single-item capacity of the focus of attention (e.g., 
Oberauer, 2002; Oberauer & Bialkova, 2009). Even past interpretation of switch costs as 
evidence of a multiple-item focus has required some addition to a methodology that had 
previously shown no such evidence. The addition of a second attribute by Gilchrist and 
Cowan (2011) to the method of Oberauer and Bialkova (2009) described earlier is one 
such example of this practice. In review, Oberauer and Bialkova found that updating one 
part of a chunk (i.e., two colors chunked together) resulted in the same switch cost as 
updating both parts, indicating multiple-items could only co-occupy the focus of attention 
when chunked together. Gilchrist and Cowan used multiple attributes (i.e., color and 
shape), which could not be easily chunked together, to show that multiple items that 
could not be chunked can both occupy the focus as interpreted by a larger switch cost 
when both items were updated rather than just one of the items.  
Oberauer and Bialkova (2011) have since supported this effect allowing that, after 
practice, the focus of attention can expand to accommodate multiple, separate items. This 
has by no means settled the debate, however. The need to make conditional changes in 
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order to show evidence for one theory or the other changes the debate from which one 
better describes the organization of working memory, to when does each theory apply. 
Under certain conditions, one theory works, under a different set the other works better. 
The question of functional dependence is an important one, but a more important 
question is which idea works in most cases? Working memory is a conceptual construct 
used as a model for understanding how memory and attention interact. As such, it is at its 
most useful when it can be applied to a multitude of different situation and conditions. To 
this end, the current results were obtained with no specific alteration to past methodology 
that showed evidence of a single-item account. These data were obtained only with a 
deeper analysis of the switch costs without additions to the method of Oberauer and 
Kliegl (2006). In doing this, the current data shows that even though a surface 
examination of object switch costs may indicate a single item as functionally distinct and 
requiring its own component in working memory, a closer examination shows this to be 
an oversimplified interpretation.  
The present study supports the predictions of a multiple-item focus of attention 
that can appropriate disparate resources to these multiple items. This resource allotment 
may be accomplished through a continuous gradation or by appropriating multiple 
discrete slots to some items. This particular debate is not one that can be answered 
thoroughly enough by the present data. Furthermore, this question may itself be 
functionally different than the question of multiple- versus single-item capacity. Whereas 
a multiple-item account is described here as more useful than its counterpart for its 
theoretical stability across conditional changes, the manner of resource allotment may be 
more a question of placement on a spectrum between the two, rather than wholly one or 
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the other (Suchow, Foughnie, Brady, & Alvarez, 2014). For this reason, this debate is left 
for future research better suited to pinpoint this spectral placement. 
A representation of the manner in which a multiple-item, but not a single-item 
focus of attention is supported (for the 3-box condition) is shown in Figure 6. Figure 6a 
presents a representation of a single-item focus being switched from item-to-item with 
each individual trial, while Figure 6b represents gradated resource allotment to all three 
items on each trial. This particular figure provides a representation of a switch trial, but 
can easily be used to imagine repetition trials (as is done below). A repetition cannot be 
explained in the Figure 6a representation while a further increase in level of activation 
(i.e., in Figure 6b, an increase in font size) of a repeated item would account for an 
increase in the cost of switching away from this repeated item.  
This repetition explanation may also account for the greater observed effect for 
the 3-box trials over the 2-box trials. With only two items, the representational difference 
in Figure 6 would show that the single- and multiple-item accounts are functionally 
identical (i.e., each would merely provide a different representation of the same thing 
happening: one item given more attention while the other loses attention). Therefore, both 
a single- and multiple-item account would predict a lesser effect for 2-box trials. 
However, expanding beyond a 2-trial representation would show further possible 
gradation for a multiple-item focus (i.e., in Figure 6b, the repeated item is represented 
with a continually increasing font size as the non-utilized item is continually minimized), 
whereas a single-item focus would be unable to account for further differences in 
accessibility between the two items. The current study showed only a trend approaching 
this 2-item gradation process (see Figure 4), but future research examining more than 
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three repetitions or using different memoranda could present this as another significant 
limitation for a single-item focus of attention. 
The representation in Figure 6 can also be used to provide a possible locus for the 
dual effects in the overall RT data. These effects are best observed in the 3-box panel of 
Figure 5. The no-switch trials show a repetition benefit from 1-repetition to 2-repetitions 
with no further benefit at 3-repetitions. Conversely, the switch trials show no ‘true’ 
switch cost from 1-repetition to 2-repetitions, but do show such an effect at 3-repetitions. 
One possible interpretation of the dual effects is that, following 1-repetition, as yet 
unassigned resources are being allotted to the item (i.e., here imagined as an increase in 
font size of the repeated item) while the ‘true’ switch cost following a 2nd repetition could 
be from re-allocation of resources from the unutilized items to the repeated item (i.e., 
here imagined as a decrease in the font size of one or both of the unutilized items).This 
interpretation asserts that all items are allotted equal resources until one is selected to be 
updated; after which, that item is then allotted all spare attentional resources. Further 
repetition of that item then requires re-allocation of already assigned resources. The 
initial allocation of spare resources would explain why there is a benefit for that item 
with no cost to the others, whereas the re-allocation of resources would explain the cost 
to the unutilized items. A problem with this interpretation is that the repeated item is 
given more resources following each repetition, yet there is no further benefit to that item 
at 3-repetitions. It is possible that, despite being allotted further attention resources, no 
further benefit is possible due to a floor in RT before this point. If this were true it would 
mean the cognitive process of re-allotment of attention resources is flawed, at least in this 
one instance. However, this is by no means a conclusive interpretation, but rather one 
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possibility assumed from a single data set. This is another promising potential line of 
future research.  
The classic interpretation of switch costs is that they indicate a single-item being 
moved into the focus of attention, replacing a previously focused item. An alternative 
view of switch costs, which requires more than just an item’s presence versus absence in 
the focus of attention, is partially supported here. Specifically, an item that remains 
currently relevant over several trials becomes higher in priority than an item that has only 
been currently relevant for one trial. This interpretation is supported by trends for either 2 
or 3 items, though significantly so only for 3 items. Further evidence against the use of 
object switch costs as evidence of a discrete, single-item focus of attention is the presence 
of an interaction effect between the Switch/NoSwitch and repetition conditions. This 
interaction is revealed through an examination of the overall RT data from which the 
switch cost manipulation of data (i.e., RTn² - RTn¹) to be driven by the presence of two 
different effects underlying the switch cost. This effect is washed out using the 
subtraction equation used to obtain the object switch costs further diminishing the 
interpretive power of this particular data manipulation. 
It should also be noted that these data cannot conclusively be said to confirm the 
necessity of a focus of attention. It is possible that an organization of working memory 
could work with the items described here as those in the focus are merely a subset of long 
term memory representations (see Figure 7). This account would attribute the repetition 
benefit as a consequence of learning which strengthens the object locations in long term 
memory. Any switch cost present could then be considered an effect of a learned 
expected update not occurring. This is an important possibility to note as the switch cost 
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paradigm is used to argue different organizational arrangements of the focus of attention 
even though switch costs cannot be said to confirm even the existence of a focus, let 
alone how it is arranged. 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
No matter which explanation of the multiple target-object repetitions causing 
increased switch costs is correct, the present result places an important and strong 
constraint on an often-studied phenomenon.  Here it is shown that an effect previously 
thought to be indicative of a single mechanism, object switch costs, has potentially 
neglected to find a second underlying mechanism, repetition benefits, due to its being 
subtracted out by examining only the difference in RT between conditions of switch and 
no-switch. Any adequate theory of how attention is used in working memory must 
accommodate these results. There are certainly occasions in which a single-item account 
of the focus of attention better conceptualizes the organization of working memory. 
However, these occasions would then presumably have a superfluous component in the 
region of direct access (Oberauer, 2002). The multiple-item focus of attention of the 
embedded-processes model (Cowan, 2001) is able to accomplish the most important goal 
of a conceptualization: it works across many functional conditions and task demands. 
Minor methodological adjustments to past data (Oberauer & Bialkova, 2009) in-line with 
a single-item focus have provided data better interpreted when allowing multiple-items in 
the focus (Gilchrist & Cowan, 2011; Oberauer & Bialkova, 2011). The present data 
further expand the interpretive range of a multiple-item focus without relying on 
 35 
 
methodological changes and instead simply delving deeper into data from a method 
previously interpreted superficially as evidence of a single-item focus (Oberauer & 
Kliegl, 2006). 
Several future avenues of research can commence stemming from this initial line 
of work. An investigation of the significance of the repetition effect for three but not two 
items is one such possibility. Whether or not there is even any functional difference 
between a single-item focus and a multi-item focus with only two items remains an open 
question. A few possible research directions follow. Simply adding further repetitions 
into the design of the experiment may show that greater repetition would lead to a 
repeatedly probed item becoming more highly accessible after the 3-repetition cut-off 
point of the present study. Similarly, use of a design in which an item is repeatedly 
probed without update (i.e., without changing the item’s identity each trial) may show a 
significant trend showing two items can become more accessible. This would indicate the 
lack of significance for the current study was due to the updating procedure and not 
because only one item of in the focus of attention. Another possibility is that individual 
differences are negating a 2-box effect present only in some participants. One way to test 
this would be to separate participants into high working memory span and low working 
memory span groups. It could be that only one of these groups shows the effect and, for 
the current study, the other group is negating the effect in the data. This study proposes a 
flaw in the use of the switch cost measure to answer the question of focus capacity, 
therefore future research would benefit from a different measure to investigate open 
questions about the focus and working memory in general. No definitive conclusion is 
reached in this discussion about where on a spectrum of continuous gradation of 
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memoranda and discrete slots for individual items the focus of attention falls. This 
question could be answered with a better understanding of the separate, dual effect seen 
in the raw RT data. Why don’t these effects (the repetition benefit and ‘true’ switch cost) 
happen in tandem? Why does the benefit precede the cost? Why is the benefit a larger 
effect than the cost? Why is there a benefit for two or three items, but no cost for two 
items (see Figure 5)? Answering these and other questions will lead to a better overall 
understanding of the processes of working memory. 
 37 
 
References 
Barrouillet, P., Portrat, S., & Camos, V. (2011). On the law relating processing to storage 
in working memory. Psychological Review, 118(2), 175. 
Burrows, D. & Okada, R. (1975) Memory retrieval from long and short lists.  Science, 
188, 1031–1033. 
Carroll, L.M., Jalbert, A., Penney, A.M., Neath, I., Surprenant, A.M., & Tehan, G. 
(2010).  Evidence for proactive interference in the focus of attention of working 
memory, Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 64, 208–214. 
Conway, A.R. Kane, M.J., & Engle, R.W. (2003). Working memory capacity and its 
relation to general intelligence. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 7(12), 547-552. 
Cowan, N. (1995).  Attention and memory:  an integrated framework.  Oxford 
Psychology Series #26.  New York:  Oxford University Press. 
Cowan, N. (1999).  An embedded-processes model of working memory.  In A. Miyake & 
P. Shah (eds.), Models of Working Memory:  Mechanisms of active maintenance 
and executive control.  Cambridge, U.K.:  Cambridge University Press. (pp. 62-
101) 
Cowan, N. (2001).  The magical number 4 in short-term memory:  A reconsideration of 
mental storage capacity.  Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24, 87-185. 
Cowan, N.  (2011). The focus of attention as observed in visual working memory tasks:  
Making sense of competing claims.  Neuropsychologia, 49, 1401-1406. 
Cowan, N., Blume, C.L., & Saults, J.S. (2013). Attention to attributes and objects in 
working memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 39(3), 731-747. 
 38 
 
Cowan, N., Elliot, E.M., Saults, J.S., Morey, C.C., Mattox, S., Hismajatullina, A., & 
Conway, A.R.A. (2005). On the capacity of attention: Its estimation and its role in 
working memory and cognitive aptitudes. Cognitive Psychology, 51(1) 42-100. 
Cowan, N., Johnson, T.D., & Saults, J.S. (2005).  Capacity limits in list item recognition: 
Evidence from proactive interference.  Memory, 13, 293-299. 
Engle, R.W., Kane, M.J., & Tuholski, S.W. (1999). Individual differences in working 
memory capacity and what they tell us about controlled attention, general fluid 
intelligence, and functions of the prefrontal cortex. Models of working memory: 
Mechanisms of active maintenance and control, 102-134. 
Ericsson, K.A., & Kintsch, W. (1995).  Long-term working memory.  Psychological 
Review, 102, 211-245. 
Garavan, H. (1998).  Serial attention within working memory.  Memory & Cognition, 26, 
263-276. 
Gilchrist, A.L., & Cowan, N. (2011).  Can the focus of attention accommodate multiple 
separate items?  Journal of Experimental Psychology:  Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 37(6), 1484-1502. 
Halford, G. S., Maybery, M. T., & Bain, J. D. (1988). Set-size effects in primary 
memory: An age-related capacity limitation? Memory & Cognition, 16(5), 480-
487. 
Jaeggi, S.M., Buschkuehl, M., Jonides, J., & Perrig, W.J. (2008). Improving fluid 
intelligence with training on working memory. Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences, 105(19), 6829-6833. 
James, W. (1885). Experiments in memory. Science, 6, 198-199. 
 39 
 
James, W. (1890).  The principles of psychology.  NY:  Henry Holt. 
Jevons, W.S. (1871). The power of numerical discrimination. Nature, 3(67),281-282. 
Klingberg, T., Forssberg, H., & Westerberg, H. (2002). Training of working memory in 
children with ADHD. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology, 
24(6), 781-791. 
Luck, S.J., & Vogel, E.K. (1997). The capacity of visual working memory for features 
and conjunctions. Nature, 390(6657), 279-281. 
McElree, B. (1998).  Attended and non-attended states in working memory:  Accessing 
categorized structures.  Journal of Memory and Language, 38, 225-252. 
McElree, B., & Dosher, B.A. (1989). Serial position and set size in short-term memory: 
The time course of recognition. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 
118(4), 346. 
Melby-Lervåg, M., & Hulme, C. (2013). Is working memory training effective? A meta-
analytic review. Developmental Psychology, 49, 270–291. 
Naveh-Benjamin, M., & Jonides, J. (1986). Maintenance rehearsal: A two-component 
analysis. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 
10(3), 369-385. 
Oberauer, K. (2002).  Access to information in working memory:  exploring the focus of 
attention.  Journal of Experimental Psychology:  Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 28, 411-421. 
Oberauer, K. (2005).  Control of the contents of working memory—A comparison of two 
paradigms and two age groups.  Journal of Experimental Psychology:  Learning, 
Memory, and Cognition, 31, 714–728. 
 40 
 
Oberauer, K. (2006).  Is the focus of attention in working memory expanded through 
practice? Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 32, 197-214.  
Oberauer, K., & Bialkova, S. (2009).  Accessing information in working memory:  Can 
the focus of attention grasp two elements at the same time?  Journal of 
Experimental Psychology:  General, 138, 64-87. 
Oberauer, K., & Bialkova, S. (2011). Serial and parallel processes in working memory 
after practice. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and 
Performance, 37, 606-614. 
Oberauer, K., & Kliegl, R. (2006). A formal model of capacity limits in working 
memory. Journal of Memory and Language, 55(4), 601-626. 
Oberauer, K., & Vockenberg, K. (2009).  Updating of working memory: Lingering 
bindings.  The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 62, 967-987. 
Pashler, H. (1992). Attentional limitations in doing two tasks at the same time. Current 
Directions in Psychological Science, 1(2), 44-48. 
Schmeichel, B.J., Volokhov, R.N., & Demaree, H.A. (2008). Working memory capacity 
and the self-regulation of emotional expression and experience. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 95(6), 1526-1540. 
Shipstead, Z., Redick, T.S., & Engle, R.W. (2012).  Is working memory training 
effective? Psychological Bulletin, 138, 628-654. 
Sternberg, S. (1966).  High-speed scanning in human memory.  Science, 153, 652-654. 
 41 
 
Suchow, J.W., Fougnie, D., Brady, T.F., & Alvarez, G.A. (2014). Terms of the debate on 
the format and structure of visual memory. Attention, Perception, & 
Psychophysics, 25, 824-831. 
Unsworth, N., & Engle, R.W. (2007).  The nature of individual differences in working 
memory capacity:  Active maintenance in primary memory and controlled search 
from secondary memory.  Psychological Review, 114, 104-132. 
Zhang, W., &  Luck, S.J. (2008).  Discrete fixed-resolution representations in visual 
working memory. Nature, 453, 233-5. 
 42 
 
Table 1 
Reaction Time and Proportion Correct Means (with SEM), Experiment 1 
    Pre-Switch Repetitions        
    
                    1            2            3          
Items Box Type Mean SEM  Mean SEM  Mean SEM  
 
Reaction Time (RT) in ms 
2 Same  2140 71  2001 71  1994 89 
2 Switched 2409 65  2371 66  2479 114 
 
3 Same  2310 63  2080 79  2095 127 
3 Switched 2919 96  2927 118  3091 152 
 
Proportion Correct 
2 Same  0.97 0.00  0.97 0.01  0.97 0.01 
2 Switched 0.90 0.01  0.92 0.01  0.88 0.02 
 
3 Same  0.96 0.01  0.98 0.01  0.96 0.02 
3 Switched 0.86 0.02  0.86 0.02  0.86 0.03 
 
Note.  RT included only trials with correct responding preceded by 100% correct 
responding in that trial block.  Participants without data for every cell were omitted.   
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Table 2 
Reaction Time and Proportion Correct Means (with SEM), Experiments 1 & 2 
    Pre-Switch Repetitions         
  
            1            2            3          
Items Box Type Mean SEM  Mean SEM  Mean SEM  
 
Reaction Time (RT) in ms 
2 Same  1996 51  1898 49  1864 66 
2 Switched 2325 50  2287 51  2319 75 
 
3 Same  2166 54  1962 53  1983 75 
3 Switched 2721 70  2748 81  2882 103 
 
Proportion Correct 
2 Same  0.93 0.01  0.93 0.01  0.94 0.01 
2 Switched 0.88 0.01  0.86 0.01  0.86 0.02 
 
3 Same  0.91 0.01  0.93 0.01  0.93 0.02 
3 Switched 0.83 0.02  0.83 0.02  0.84 0.02 
 
Note.  RT included only trials with correct responding preceded by 100% correct 
responding in that trial block.  Participants without data for every cell were omitted.   
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
Object Switch Costs (+/- Std. Error), Experiment 1
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Figure 4 
Object Switch Costs (+/- Std. Error), Experiments 1 & 2
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Figure 7 
 
